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The MacArthur Foundation is pleased to have been part of a group of funders that collaborated to support the 
National Campaign to Reform State Juvenile Justice Systems, thereby helping to advance juvenile justice reforms 
in thirty states across the country.
The Foundation has funded work in juvenile justice since 1996, when the MacArthur Research Network on 
Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice was launched. At a time when it seemed the original ideal of a 
separate justice system for young people was imperiled by a wave of punitive legislation targeting youth crime, our 
support enabled researchers to conduct a series of high-profile studies establishing the profound developmental 
differences between adolescents and adults. In 2004, seeking to translate these findings into justice policy and 
practice, we began the Models for Change initiative, a long-term effort to support developmentally appropriate 
policy and practice reform in a small number of bellwether states. The National Campaign to Reform State 
Juvenile Justice Systems, launched six years later, was aimed at capitalizing on reform momentum and spreading 
it more broadly. Working in states identified as offering realistic opportunities to achieve sustainable legislative 
and policy change, the National Campaign provided advocates and officials with the strategic resources they 
needed to advance bipartisan reform agendas, including expertise in communications, policy analysis and 
government affairs.
Importantly, the Foundation’s work focused on reform efforts which, in some cases, included changes in 
legislation. In light of lobbying restrictions applicable to private foundations, MacArthur was careful to ensure 
that the grants it made complied with the applicable lobbying laws. This evaluation focuses on one aspect of 
the reform efforts and evaluates the impact the grantees had with respect to legislative changes within the 
permitted constraints of the law.
The Foundation is gratified by the results achieved by the National Campaign, which in five years of work 
succeeded in advancing tangible juvenile justice reforms in thirty states. These included measures to ensure 
that young people are processed in juvenile court rather than criminal court, increased use of diversion and 
community-based programs in lieu of incarceration, improvements in conditions of confinement, increased 
access to counsel, and policies that prevent school behavior from leading to justice involvement.
We recognize the constraints of a time-limited campaign strategy, as highlighted in this evaluation, and particularly 
the possibility that gains achieved with the help of the National Campaign could be lost once those resources are 
withdrawn. In supporting future efforts of this kind, we will give more thought to the issue of sustainability, and 
to what it takes to build permanent local capacity to defend reforms achieved.
Julia Stasch
President, MacArthur Foundation
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This independent evaluation was commissioned by the MacArthur Foundation. 
Its contents do not necessarily represent the views of the Foundation.
Background, Goals, and Approach
For two decades, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation invested significantly in juvenile justice 
work in the United States. The Foundation’s entry into the field was prompted by policy changes that threatened 
to erase the boundaries between juvenile and criminal justice. Evidence about the profound developmental 
differences between adolescents and adults underpinned the Foundation’s Models for Change initiative, which it 
launched in 2003. Models for Change was a $121 million effort to bring about changes in law, policy, and practice, 
and to provide models for juvenile justice reform. Ultimately, Models for Change was active in 16 states.1
Six years into the Models for Change initiative, the MacArthur Foundation considered three possible scenarios: 
1) secure its investment, phasing out Models for Change; 2) expand its current strategy, building on Models for 
Change incrementally, engaging more states, and creating more examples of successful reform; or 3) capitalize 
on the momentum underway, launching a multi-state campaign across the country aimed at changing juvenile 
justice policy. In reviewing these options, the MacArthur Foundation proposed capitalizing on the momentum 
underway. It saw a unique alignment of social, economic, and political factors for improving juvenile justice 
policies nationally and an opportunity to collaborate with other funders and government agencies to speed up 
the adoption of practices that would make states’ juvenile justice systems fairer.2
National Campaign
The timing was deemed right to take bolder action, and the MacArthur Foundation’s long-term aim was to help 
support the “next wave” of reforms across the country. With that opportunity in mind, M+R Strategic Services 
(M+R) conducted an assessment to determine what a campaign to reform the nation’s juvenile justice systems 
would entail. This information-gathering process included interviews with experts in the field of juvenile justice 
reform and individuals involved with Models for Change. Based on the findings from the assessment, in the spring 
of 2010, M+R proposed a five-year campaign to work in 40 states. The main goal of the multi-state campaign 
was to enact meaningful juvenile justice reforms—that would save money, improve public safety, lower 
recidivism, keep young people out of the juvenile justice system, and increase alternatives to incarceration—
in 75% of the targeted states.
In its assessment in 2010, M+R concluded that there was little consensus among experts in the field about the 
juvenile justice priorities for each state to address and that a “big-tent” approach was needed to broaden and 
strengthen the constituency supporting juvenile justice reforms. Based on these and other conclusions from 
M+R’s research, the MacArthur Foundation engaged other funders and led the formation of the Juvenile Justice 
Funders’ Collaborative. The Funders’ Collaborative, housed at Public Interest Projects,3 hired M+R to manage the 
National Campaign to Reform State Juvenile Justice Systems (National Campaign). In addition to the MacArthur 
Foundation, which was the primary funder, the Funders’ Collaborative included: the Edward S. Moore Family 
1
 1 More information about the MacArthur Foundation’s juvenile justice strategy and grantmaking priorities can be found at www.macfound.org/  
 programs/juvenile_justice/strategy.
 2 Source: The Discussion Paper on a National Campaign for Juvenile Justice Systems Reform, June 2010, pages 5-6.
 3 Public Interest Projects is now NEO Philanthropy.
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Foundation, the Gund Foundation, the Interact Foundation, the New York Community Trust, the Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation, the Sapelo Foundation, and Wellspring. The MacArthur Foundation’s total investment in 
the National Campaign between 2011 and 2015 was $18,050,000. Additional contributions came from members 
of the Funders’ Collaborative and other sources, bringing the total budget closer to $5 to $7 million annually. 
In 2016, the MacArthur Foundation provided a grant to the Rockefeller Family Fund to support a final year of 
operations for the National Campaign. Under its Juvenile Justice Fund, the Rockefeller Family Fund retained 
M+R to develop and execute the final year of a public policy campaign to bring about significant juvenile justice 
systems reform in up to 15 states across the country.4
To achieve the ambitious goal of enacting meaningful juvenile justice reforms in 75% of the targeted states over 
a five-year period, M+R, in collaboration with the MacArthur Foundation and Funders’ Collaborative, developed 
and implemented a National Campaign consisting of three components:
2
 4 Source: Rockefeller Family Fund grant brief, June 16, 2016, page 1.
 5 Each year the state selections were presented to and approved by the Funders’ Collaborative.
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Conducting assessments to 
identify states to work in that 
offered realistic opportunities  
to achieve reform. State 
selection criteria used by the 
National Campaign included  
the availability of champions  
and allies, the policy climate,  
and local organizations’  
capacity and receptivity.5 
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Assembling state-based teams 
of local advocates, judges, 
law enforcement officials, and 
others to identify the parts of 
the juvenile justice system that 
needed change the most and  
to determine the reform 
agendas.
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Providing strategic, logistical, and financial 
resources to achieve each state’s reform goals. 
This usually included hiring seasoned government 
affairs professionals, communications experts, and 
policy analysts to work with local juvenile justice 
advocates, elected officials, and policymakers 
to shape and advance agendas that hold youth 
accountable for their actions, provide rehabilitation, 
improve public safety, lower recidivism rates, and 
assist youth and their families.
The approach was designed to enable the National Campaign to be practical and nimble, build bipartisan support 
for juvenile justice reforms, and generate successive waves of state policy reforms that would create momentum 
for new and stronger reforms throughout the country. Although the overall approach remained consistent, each 
year National Campaign staff at M+R crafted proposals that detailed activities and adjustments to campaign 
operations. The annual proposals were presented to the Funders’ Collaborative for review and approval.
In light of lobbying restrictions applicable to private foundations, the MacArthur Foundation was careful to 
ensure that its grants complied with the applicable lobbying laws. Under the law, the Foundation could provide 
project support to charitable organizations that might lobby if the Foundation received a budget that reflected 
a breakdown between the non-lobbying expenses of the project and any lobbying expenses, the Foundation’s 
grant was less than the non-lobbying expenses, and none of the Foundation’s funds were earmarked for lobbying. 
Alternatively, the MacArthur Foundation could prohibit grantees from using its funds to lobby, but grantees could 
use other funds to participate in lobbying activities within the legally accepted limits.
National Communications Effort
A year into the National Campaign, M+R proposed a complementary national communications strategy.6 Models 
for Change had produced best practices and tools to help advocates and practitioners advance systemic reform, 
and the National Campaign sought to make those reforms a reality. However, despite the early success of the 
National Campaign and the legacy of Models for Change, juvenile justice reform had yet to become a mainstream 
cause. The MacArthur Foundation was interested in pursuing a parallel communications effort that would 
complement various juvenile justice initiatives and help successfully position a “Fourth Wave of Juvenile Justice 
Reform.”7
After a thorough planning process in 2012, a National Communications Effort8 implemented by M+R got 
underway in 2013. The MacArthur Foundation, in consultation with the National Campaign, decided to make 
the National Communications Effort complementary to the National Campaign rather than connected to it. This 
decision reflected the concern that a national, foundation-backed communications effort could potentially hurt 
rather than help some reform efforts, especially given the difference state to state in existing policy, politics, and 
the reforms pursued. Therefore, the National Communications Effort sought to shape and elevate a national 
conversation, separate from the National Campaign’s work in the states, that would generate awareness of, and 
support for, juvenile justice reform so that more states would feel pressure to advance or sustain juvenile justice 
reforms. The National Communications Effort translated this objective into two specific communications 
goals: 1) to raise awareness among people who should care about young people touched by the system (and 
could do something to improve their outcomes) and 2) to work with advocates in ways that would highlight 
available solutions and could benefit or complement their reform work.
The National Communications Effort was an experimental undertaking to reach an audience beyond the community 
of advocates and practitioners working to advance reform. Targeting people who would or should care about 
policies that hurt young people, the National Communications Effort’s primary audiences were young adults, 
ages 18 to 24 years, and parents, ages 35 to 50 years. Additionally, through its work with advocates, the National 
Communications Effort sought to reach a secondary audience of policymakers and practitioners. Throughout the 
duration of the National Communications Effort, the goals and target audiences remained consistent. However, 
as an endeavor to learn how communications could seed broader support for juvenile justice reform, the National 
Communications Effort regularly reviewed its progress and made adjustments to its approach to account for 
lessons learned along the way. The Foundation’s investment in the National Communications Effort, $1,800,000, 
was modest compared to the National Campaign.
Learning Objectives, Information-Gathering Process, and Analysis
National Campaign
The main purpose of the evaluation was to determine how effective the National Campaign was in achieving 
legislative9 and policy change in state juvenile justice systems and to answer one overarching question: Has the 
3
 6 Sources: The 2012 proposal to Public Interest Projects submitted in the fall of 2011. M+R provided more detail about the potential  
 communications strategy in a memorandum to the MacArthur Foundation in November 2011.
 7 The four waves of juvenile justice reform are characterized as: 1) 1899 and early twentieth century: individualized treatment and rehabilitation,  
 2) 1960s: due process protections, 3) 1990s: punitive backlash; 2000 and beyond: public safety, accountability, and positive outcomes for youth.  
 Source: The Fourth Wave Juvenile Justice Reforms for the Twenty-First Century (short version), March 13, 2013, page 3.
 8 In materials developed by M+R, this effort is also referred to as the Communications Campaign or Public Relations Campaign.
 9 The evaluation of the National Campaign focused on these types of reforms and the impact that the National Campaign had with respect to  
 legislative changes within the permitted constraints of the law applicable to private foundations.
4National Campaign contributed to the sought after “next wave” of reform in juvenile justice? The evaluation 
design addressed four areas of inquiry and a series of learning questions about outcomes, contexts, strategy 
in action, and implications. The information-gathering process and analysis involved to develop the final report 
included the following elements:
 •  One-on-one and small-group interviews with MacArthur Foundation staff, National Campaign staff at  
     M+R, funders, juvenile justice advocates, and observers of the field
 •  Site visits to nine states where campaigns were active in 2013, 2014, or 2015 (three were chosen to  
     represent each year): Arkansas, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, South Carolina, Utah,  
     Virginia, Washington
 •  Two rounds of surveys (one in 2014 and one in 2015) of juvenile justice reform stakeholders in 36 of 37  
     states that the National Campaign worked in from 2011 to 2015
 •  A comprehensive review of materials developed in association with the National Campaign, including  
     strategy and planning documents
 •  Analysis of M+R’s self-reported data, tracking mechanisms, and progress reports, complemented by  
     some independent policy research to corroborate M+R’s reports
National Communications Effort
This evaluation’s principal focus was to determine if and how the National Communications Effort shaped and 
elevated a narrative that reached its target audiences and increased their understanding and support for juvenile 
justice reform. More broadly, the evaluation also examined the ways in which a complementary, experimental 
communications strategy could help support and sustain a movement of juvenile justice reform. Additionally, the 
MacArthur Foundation expressed a desire to know whether the National Communications Effort had an impact on 
policy reform and the broader media landscape, even though these were not objectives or intended outcomes of 
the National Communications Effort. In response, the evaluation methodology included the following elements:
 •  Comprehensive review of strategy and planning documents developed for the National Communications  
     Effort, M+R’s self-reported data on benchmarks and metrics, and progress reports
 •  Message penetration and saturation analysis of media coverage and Twitter conversations generated by  
     the National Communications Effort
 •  Message penetration and saturation analysis of national media coverage and Twitter conversations  
     about juvenile justice
 •  Review and analysis of demographic data of Facebook users who followed the Mistakes Kids Make page  
     or clicked on Mistakes Kids Make ads
 •  Compilation and analysis of self-reported biographical information from Twitter users who Tweeted  
     about the National Communications Effort or the media coverage generated by the National  
     Communications Effort
 •  Compilation and analysis of quotes by 11 National Communications Effort spokespeople in media from  
     2011 to 2015 to assess changes in their media profiles and influence
 •  In-depth qualitative review of media coverage and Twitter conversations related to three “breakthrough  
     moments” per year in the national landscape from 2011 to 2015
 •  One-on-one interviews with nine stakeholders involved with the National Communications Effort in  
     2013, including juvenile justice partners, state-based advocates, affinity groups, and M+R staff
 •  Analysis of reports developed and released by the National Communications Effort, including a  
     qualitative review of media coverage secured for each
5National Campaign: Results
From 2011 through 2015, the National Campaign supported state campaigns in 37 states. It retained 55 lobby 
firms, 41 policy and state campaign coordinators, 16 public affairs and communications professionals, and it 
invested in six research and polling projects to advance each state’s unique reform agenda. In total, over the 
course of five years, 127 legislative bills, budgets, and Supreme Court Rules supported by the National Campaign 
were adopted, and approximately 208 reforms were enacted and regressive measures defeated. More detailed 
results are included in the illustration and tables that follow.
States the National Campaign Worked in Each Year
New States (Goal) New States (Actual) Continued State Activity
Actual # of States  
Worked In
2011 8 to 1010 7 7
2012 8 to 1011 7 6 13
2013 7 to 1012 7 11 18
2014 7 to 1013 9 16 25
2015 7 to 1014 7 24 31
TOTAL: 37
 10 Proposal for a Campaign to Reform Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2011), October 18, 2010, page 3.
 11 Proposal for a Campaign to Reform Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2012), September 2011, pages 6-7.
 12 Proposal for a Campaign to Reform Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2013), August 24, 2012, page 4.
 13 Proposal for a Campaign to Reform Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2014), September 4, 2013, page 4.
 14 Proposal for a Campaign to Reform Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2015), September 4, 2014, page 5.
goal
enactment
reform
e n a c t e d
r e fo r m s
of participating 
states to enact one 
or more juvenile 
justice reforms 
of participating 
states enacted one 
or more juvenile 
justice reforms 
States that enacted one or more reforms
States that enacted no reforms
Non-participating states
actual
National Communications Effort: Results
Over the course of three years, the National Communications Effort secured more than 1.4 billion media 
impressions, generated more than 900,000 social media interactions, created the largest Facebook community 
dedicated to juvenile justice with 45,450 followers, produced and released six major reports and an interactive 
online storytelling project, and developed communications assets and capabilities for more than a dozen juvenile 
justice organizations. More detailed results are included in the following tables.
Media Impressions and Online Interactions
Media  
Impressions 
(Goal)
Media  
Impressions 
(Actual)
Online  
Interactions 
(Goal)
Online 
Interactions 
(Actual)
Facebook 
Followers 
(Goal)
Facebook 
Followers 
(Actual)
2013 11M 81M 500K 343K 40K 11K
2014 150M 820M 250K 275K n/a16 29K
2015 190M 229M 250K 374K n/a 45K
TOTALS: 351M 1,130M 1,000K 992K 40K 45K17
6
 15 These figures were compiled from the following sources: Matrix of Wins (2011-2015 Enacted Legislation), Annual Campaign Tallies, State  
  Campaign Wins and Losses 2011-2015, Year-by-Year Overviews of State Campaign Agendas and Legislative Reports, and exchanges with M+R  
  staff. Goals, successes, and losses were not tracked in an entirely consistent manner over the span of the National Campaign. Also, the National  
  Campaign did not track bill numbers for legislative reforms that were not enacted, which made it more difficult to independently verify losses.  
  This represents our best effort to tabulate the total number of reforms pursued, including but not limited to legislation, and how many of the  
  reforms supported by the National Campaign were successful and unsuccessful. The actual successes may be slightly higher or lower.
 16 After 2013, M+R did not specify a goal for the Mistakes Kids Make Facebook page. Without a baseline from other juvenile justice groups at  
  the time, M+R based the goal of 40,000 on previous communities they had built. However, growth of the page was limited due to the lack of  
  advocacy-related asks that are ideal for social media. Nonetheless, Mistakes Kids Make became the largest Facebook community dedicated to  
  juvenile justice.
 17 This figure is the size of the Mistakes Kids Make Facebook page at the end of the National Communications Effort, not the sum of each year.
Enacted Juvenile Justice Reforms, Legislation Adopted, and Regressive Measures Defeated
Reform Goals
Reforms Enacted 
and Regressive 
Measures Defeated 
(Actual)15
Reforms and Bills  
Not Enacted15
% Successful
Enacted Legislation, 
Budgets, and  
Supreme Court 
Rules
2011 24 22 2 94% 13
2012 25 20 5 80% 8
2013 58 39 19 67% 29
2014 77 55 22 71% 29
2015 129 72 57 56% 48
TOTALS: 313 208 105 66% 127
7 18 Based on limited engagement from affinity groups in 2013, M+R shifted its approach in 2014 to focus on deeper engagement with fewer groups 
  and then suspended the affinity outreach program in mid-2014.
 19 The goals and actuals for number of juvenile justice partners supported were not necessarily cumulative, as they were split between continuing 
  work with some groups and engaging new ones. However, for the sake of comparing goals to actuals, the numbers are totaled here.
 20 Source: Proposal for a Campaign to Reform Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2013), August 24, 2012, pages 7-8. 
 21 Though M+R did not set a goal for trainings in 2013, in October of that year it hosted a training webinar for the juvenile justice community to  
  share best practices and findings from the National Communications Effort’s social media growth. More background is available in M+R’s Q4  
  2013 progress report to the MacArthur Foundation, page 11.
 22 This goal was revised downward from three to four reports to two to three. The original goal was in the Proposal for a Campaign to Reform  
  Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2013), August 24, 2012, pages 7-8. The amended goal was in the 2014 Juvenile Justice  
  Communications Campaign overview, December 18, 2013, page 5.
 23 In the 2015 Public Interest Projects proposal, M+R proposed the development and release of one large MacArthur branded report. See  
  Proposal for a Campaign to Reform Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2015), September 4, 2014, page 13. However, in the  
  quarterly progress reports for 2015, M+R also set a goal for two to three mini-products or other packaged content with juvenile justice  
  partners. The total goal for 2015 reflects the combined count of the major report and the two to three mini-products.
 24 As noted in M+R’s final progress report, M+R developed and released a major MacArthur-branded report in 2015 as well as a timeline of  
  juvenile justice history for the Burns Institute in support of a report the organization released in 2015 and an interactive shackling map for  
  the Campaign Against Indiscriminate Juvenile Shackling.
Organizations and Individuals Engaged
Affinity Groups 
(Goal)
Affinity Groups 
(Actual)
JJ Partners 
(Goal)
JJ Partners 
(Actual)
Influential  
Messengers 
(Goal)
Influential 
Messengers 
(Actual)
2013 6 - 8 9 10 - 12 13 n/a n/a
2014 1 - 218 0 4 - 8 8 n/a n/a
2015 n/a n/a 11 - 13 13 3 2
TOTALS: 7 - 10 9 25 - 3319 34 3 2
Communications Assets and Capacity Building
Reports or Products 
(Goal)
Reports or Products 
(Actual)
Trainings (Goal) Trainings (Actual)
2013 5 - 620 3 n/a 121
2014 2 - 322 3 2 - 3 0
2015 3 - 423 324 2 - 3 2
TOTALS: 10 - 13 9 4 - 6 3
8Overarching Conclusion
Together the findings in the evaluation report point to one central conclusion about the National Campaign and 
National Communications Effort:
The National Campaign’s approach was effective, and it successfully accomplished its goal to  
accelerate the enactment of meaningful juvenile justice reforms in a large number of states. The 
National Campaign’s shortcomings were mainly tactical or situational rather than strategic in nature.  
The legislative and other gains achieved by the National Campaign will have a positive impact on  
young people and families in contact with the juvenile justice system and will help generate continuing 
momentum for policy changes in the future. In addition, increased receptiveness among lawmakers,  
the emergence of support among conservative lawmakers for reforms, and continued enthusiasm  
on the part of state-based groups as a result of the work of the National Campaign are positive 
indications that there is a “Fourth Wave of Juvenile Justice Reform.”
The National Communications Effort was most successful as a learning endeavor, and some aspects  
of the National Communications Effort were implemented well. For example, progress was made  
in shaping the juvenile justice narrative and reaching a broader audience. As an experimental 
and emergent strategy, it produced valuable lessons and demonstrated that an investment in 
communications can influence how an issue is framed and has the potential to advance policy goals. 
However, the decision to separate the National Campaign and the National Communications Effort 
limited the ability of the National Communications Effort to highlight the gains of the National  
Campaign and to provide a way for a new and engaged audience to channel their support for reform  
into meaningful action that could contribute to policy changes.
9 25 These figures were compiled from the following sources: Matrix of Wins (2011-2015 Enacted Legislation), Annual Campaign Tallies, State  
  Campaign Wins and Losses 2011-2015, Year-by-Year Overviews of State Campaign Agendas and Legislative Reports, and exchanges with M+R  
  staff. This represents our best effort to tabulate the total number of reforms pursued, including but not limited to legislation, and how many of  
  the reforms supported by the National Campaign were successful. The actual successes may be slightly higher or lower.
 26 A proactive policy goal is defined in this report as one that would reform the juvenile justice system in a way that would save money, improve  
  public safety, lower recidivism, keep young people out of the juvenile justice system, or increase alternatives to incarceration. Proactive goals  
  included efforts to pass legislation that would roll back or revise punitive laws. Defensive goals are defined as efforts to block legislation or  
  policies that would have represented a further step backward for youth and families in contact with the juvenile justice system.
 27 Source: The National Campaign to Reform State Juvenile Justice Systems 2011 - 2015 Report, September 23, 2015, page 1.
Based on the National Campaign’s performance relative to its two main goals—number of reforms enacted 
and states worked in—it was successful and served as an accelerant. Over five years, the National Campaign 
made steady progress in advancing juvenile justice reforms and in blocking regressive measures. One or more 
reforms were enacted in 30 of the 37 states that the National Campaign worked in (81%), which exceeded the 
National Campaign’s goal of 75%. Of the 313 reforms pursued with support from the National Campaign, 208 
were successful, a 66% success rate.25 In addition, 127 bills, court rules, and budget measures were enacted. 
There was broad agreement among respondents from states where juvenile justice reform efforts were only 
nascent or had stalled that the National Campaign had a catalytic effect.
Overall, the National Campaign was effective; it accelerated the widespread enactment 
of policies to reform state juvenile justice systems.
FINDING 
01
Empowering state-based groups and individuals to determine specific policy goals leveraged their expertise, 
ensured local ownership of the work, and respected the fact that meaningful juvenile justice reforms are not 
identical state-to-state. By not forcing a rigid policy agenda on the state groups, the National Campaign developed 
more trust and buy-in among state campaign stakeholders. Also, the National Campaign was skilled at playing 
both offense and defense; however, the locally selected reform agendas supported by the National Campaign 
were mostly comprised of proactive policy goals.26 This is significant because it is generally easier to oppose 
measures and maintain the status quo than it is to successfully advocate for policy changes. Of the 313 reforms 
pursued and regressive measures opposed, 296 were proactive and 17 were defensive in nature. Almost two-
thirds of the attempts to enact reforms were achieved, and virtually all of the efforts to block regressive policies 
were successful. The five categories of reforms most frequently enacted included:27
 1.  Measures to keep young people in juvenile court by raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction,  
  and to treat them as youth in court proceedings (adopted in 18 states)
The National Campaign was adept at advancing policy agendas that were determined 
locally, were primarily proactive in nature, and resulted in meaningful juvenile justice 
gains.
FINDING 
02
Highlights from the Findings
 2.  Reductions in incarceration through increased use of diversion and community-based programs  
  (adopted in 14 states)
 3.  Improvements in the conditions of confinement (adopted in 10 states)
 4.  Increased access to counsel and improved court processes (adopted in 9 states)
 5.  Policies that prevent young people who are truant, defiant, or act out in school from being  
  automatically sent into the juvenile justice system (adopted in 8 states)
The reforms pursued were substantive, and particularly meaningful changes to state juvenile justice systems 
were adopted in more than one-third of the states the National Campaign worked in. In 13 of the 37 states that 
the National Campaign worked in, particularly impressive gains were made, and state campaigns pursued and 
successfully advanced agendas that reflected both legislative and non-legislative goals.28
10
 28 In assessing the significance of the gains made in each state, Grassroots Solutions considered the following: approximately how broadly the 
  effects would be felt by youth and their families in the state, the total number of reforms enacted, and the landscape in which the state  
  campaign was operating (i.e., how challenging was it to advance the reform agenda). In many of the big-win states, the age of juvenile court  
  jurisdiction was raised. Because fiscal analyses of the impacts of reforms enacted were not conducted, determining how broadly the effects of  
  reforms would be felt was a somewhat subjective exercise. Our conclusions were based on what we could glean about the reforms enacted  
  from the documentation provided, coverage in the media (where available), and consultations with National Campaign staff at M+R.
Gains by State and by Type
Big Gain: 13
Moderate Gain: 9
Small Gain: 8
No Gain: 7
Non-participating States
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11
The National Campaign’s assessment of what it would take to accelerate progress and achieve each state’s unique 
reform agenda was perceptive, and the resources and support it provided to strengthen state capacity were 
adaptable rather than “cookie cutter.” Based on M+R’s assessment of a variety of factors in each state—ripeness 
of the issue(s), availability of potent champions and allies in the public and private sectors, the political climate 
for reform, outlook within multiple branches of government, juvenile justice reform groups’ current capacity 
and track record, existence of local funding partners, the strategic value of the reforms pursued to the future 
success of the National Campaign, and the geographic region in question—the National Campaign provided 
tailored resources to bolster reform efforts. Although all forms of support provided by the National Campaign 
were reported to be helpful, resources for lobbying and strategic guidance received the highest praise. Also, the 
National Campaign’s support helped generate and leverage bipartisan backing for juvenile justice reforms. Prior 
to the National Campaign’s involvement, many local groups observed that their juvenile justice work was often 
cast as a “liberal” issue. Nine types of support comprised a framework that allowed the National Campaign to be 
responsive to local needs and opportunities.
The financial, strategic, and logistical resources provided by the National Campaign 
reflected local contexts and had an overwhelmingly positive, short-term impact on the 
advancement of state policy goals. Exceptions typically occurred in states where there 
were time constraints that prevented state campaigns from taking full advantage of the 
support offered.
FINDING 
03
types of support provided by the national campaign29 # of  States
% of  
States
Interviewed and contracted with lobbyist(s) 37 100%
Provided campaign advice and strategy ideas 33 89%
Interviewed and contracted with a policy coordinator and/or local advocate organization(s) 32* 86%
Identified key local stakeholders and facilitated discussion to confirm reform agenda 29 78%
Shared data and research on national trends and other states 26 70%
Facilitated high-level relationships with local champions and influencers 22 59%
Helped identify, recruit, and prep speakers to testify at hearings and/or made introductions  
to national juvenile justice experts where relevant
19 51%
Contracted with a media and communications consultant 15 41%
Other assistance (e.g., convened check-ins or funded polling, research, or web development 12 32%
* In six states—Arkansas, California, Georgia, Louisiana, Nevada, and Pennsylvania—the local policy coordinator was not under contract and did  
   not receive funding from the National Campaign.
 29 The figures presented in the table are derived from the survey and informed by documentation Grassroots Solutions requested from M+R.
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Being in the right place at the right time was essential to success. In some instances, the National Campaign’s 
support arrived too late to make a demonstrable difference in the first year, but helped to lay the foundation 
for the next year. In other cases, the National Campaign made the decision to work in a state after the session 
had already kicked off, so the groups and individuals involved scrambled on a compressed timeline to get a bill 
together, determine strategy, and assess the opposition.
First, success was predicated on having a feasible set of locally determined reform goals or solutions to promote. 
Secondly, the presence of nine contextual factors contributed significantly to the enactment of juvenile justice 
reforms. The most relevant factors for success included: legislative and gubernatorial champion(s), capable 
lobbyists and relationships with key legislators, bipartisan support, communications strategy and effective 
messaging, strong impetus or timeliness for reform, engaged allies (groups and individuals), the involvement 
of respected and knowledgeable local nonprofit advocacy organizations, access to juvenile justice research and 
policy expertise, capacity and ability to coordinate and manage reform efforts, an active grassroots base of 
supporters, broad public awareness, and cost-savings analyses. Three of the nine contextual factors—legislative 
and gubernatorial champion(s), capable lobbyists and relationships with key legislators, bipartisan support—
were perceived as the most influential in advancing or inhibiting state campaigns from advancing their reform 
agendas.
Given that each state had its own reform agenda and landscape, all of the factors cited were influential, and their 
interplay mattered. Grassroots support, broad public awareness, and cost-savings analyses were influential, but 
considerably less so than the other six factors explored. Juvenile justice was routinely described by interviewees 
as an issue that best lent itself to an “under the dome” strategy. That said, in certain cases, the ability to apply 
grassroots pressure was very valuable. It is worth noting that lobbyists and advocates who don’t have experience 
with grassroots engagement and mobilization often don’t know how to effectively employ it as part of an 
integrated strategy or undervalue its potential. Also, the presence of well-established coalitions did not always 
jibe well with the National Campaign’s approach. Significant gains were often made in states where there was 
some local advocacy expertise and commitment to advancing reforms, but not necessarily a long-established 
coalition focused on juvenile justice issues.
Although each state’s context and goals were unique, several factors contributed 
significantly to achieving juvenile justice policy gains. Having influential champions, 
capable lobbyists with strong relationships with targeted decision makers, and support 
on both sides of the political aisle were especially important to the enactment of 
reforms. However, no single variable typically propelled state campaigns to “win”; it 
was the interplay of influential factors and having the right people involved that were 
critical for success.
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SUCCESS FACTORS
Present in Most States 
Where Reforms Were 
Enacted?
Present in Most States 
Where No or Small Gains 
Were Made?
most influential  factors
Legislative and gubernatorial champion(s) yes no
Capable lobbyists and relationships with key legislators yes yes
Bipartisan support yes no
Communications strategy and effective messaging yes no
Strong impetus or timeliness for reform30 yes no
influential  factors
Engaged allies (e.g., judges, prosecutors, county  
administrators, department of corrections)
yes no
Respected and knowledgeable local nonprofit  
advocacy organization(s)
yes yes
Access to juvenile justice research and policy expertise yes yes
Capacity and ability to coordinate and manage reform efforts yes yes
somewhat influential  factors
Active grassroots base of supporters no no
Broad public awareness no no
Cost-savings analysis no no
 30 Examples of strong impetus or timeliness for reform included: the release of a new study, an economic imperative, opportune moment in the  
  electoral cycle, and visibility of a juvenile justice case in the media.
Although the National Campaign’s theory of change and approach remained largely 
consistent from 2011 to 2015, it was adaptable to changing contexts and lessons 
learned (positive and negative). Its flexibility and responsiveness yielded two important 
dividends: 1) a wider variety of ambitious reform packages introduced and enacted 
and 2) better relationships with organizations poised to continue with work once the 
National Campaign was no longer involved.
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The decision to make multi-year investments in state campaigns enabled the National Campaign to balance its 
dual aims of accelerating reforms in a large number of states and enacting meaningful reforms. After the first 
year of operations, National Campaign staff at M+R rightly observed that it would take longer than one year to 
achieve reforms in many states. Multi-year commitments would allow the National Campaign to develop two-
The resources and support provided by the National Campaign produced secondary benefits that extended 
beyond policy changes and increased the potential that additional reforms will be made following the National 
Campaign’s departure. Collateral benefits mentioned most frequently by respondents included: new relationships 
among local nonprofits, professional lobbyists, and communications experts; higher trust levels among some 
state-based groups and advocates; and greater awareness of juvenile justice issues (especially among lawmakers). 
The National Campaign strengthened short-term capacity at the state level, but it did not necessarily improve local 
stakeholders’ long-term power or ability to advocate for reforms or protect gains. It is important to acknowledge 
that the National Campaign was always a time-limited endeavor, and its contributions were short-term by design. 
From the beginning, the National Campaign focused on accelerating wins, and it accomplished meaningful 
legislative gains. However, based on the materials and interview data that were reviewed, when the National 
Campaign launched, not much consideration was given to what it would ideally like to see happen after its 
departure. From the materials and respondents’ feedback, it did not appear that the National Campaign created 
or implemented transition plans or steps.31 Additionally, the decision on the part of the National Campaign to 
operate (mostly) independently of national juvenile justice organizations was intentional and helped it remain 
agile, but it missed an opportunity to strengthen or make connections between national and state groups. 
Nonprofits without strong connections to the national juvenile justice community could have benefited from 
connections to national organizations that could have provided longer-term strategic advice and support.
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While the National Campaign’s involvement produced collateral benefits for local 
advocates beyond policy changes, the boost to state-level capacity was short-term, and 
it is not clear whether gains made will necessarily be sustainable.
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year strategies, laying the foundation for reforms in the first year that could be achieved in the second, or to 
take advantage of successes in the first year that could pave the way for further (often more ambitious) reforms 
thereafter. Also, choosing to consistently provide funding for local nonprofits and advocacy organizations (where 
it was applicable) engendered goodwill and contributed to better working relationships among the groups and 
individuals involved in each state. One of the most pointed critiques of the National Campaign after 2011 and 
2012 was that it did not fund local organizations (although in most states, funding was available).
The National Campaign’s support for omnibus legislation and agendas comprised of multiple reforms helped state 
campaigns to achieve a variety of juvenile justice gains in a short period of time. The pursuit of multiple reforms 
often broadened the appeal among local allies and state campaign stakeholders and made compromise more 
palatable. Even if some aspects of the reform agenda were unappealing to some local stakeholders, there was 
something to like. With encouragement from the National Campaign, state campaigns developed a successful 
track record of advocating for more reforms per legislative session, either by advocating for multiple juvenile 
justice bills or for an omnibus package of reforms. Additionally, supporting and expanding legislative efforts to 
abolish indiscriminate shackling of young people was another illustration of the National Campaign’s ability to 
seize emergent opportunities and adapt to changing contexts.
 31 In a few instances, respondents reported that progress would be “undone” following the National Campaign’s departure and that opposition  
  to reforms may emerge as a result of the National Campaign’s success. However, with the data at Grassroots Solutions’ disposal, it was difficult  
  to independently verify the extent to which the gains made were threatened or reversed. It is worth noting that it was not an expectation  
  that the National Campaign track where legislative gains were rolled back. In the future, monitoring and having access to this type of  
  information would help to better assess the sustainability of the gains made.
The National Campaign demonstrated that by being focused (on juvenile justice and mainly legislative gains) 
it was possible to achieve significant, incremental policy changes relatively quickly. Because juvenile justice is 
largely a state-level matter, concentrating on legislative gains was one of the surest ways to have an immediate 
and positive impact on young people and families who came into contact with the system. Unlike many local 
nonprofit organizations that supported agendas broader than juvenile justice, the National Campaign could direct 
its lobbyists and communications professionals to concentrate on enacting reforms that would save money, 
improve public safety, lower recidivism, keep young people out of the juvenile justice system, and increase 
alternatives to incarceration.
Additionally, the National Campaign applied a practical lens, and its willingness to compromise was integral to 
the National Campaign’s success in accelerating the enactment of juvenile justice reforms. In several states, bills 
would not have come to fruition had the National Campaign maintained a rigid posture about what constituted 
success. Respondents acknowledged that compromise often meant that not everyone involved in the state 
campaign was satisfied—particularly organizations or individuals that had been working on juvenile justice issues 
the longest—but most ultimately recognized that adhering to an unwavering reform agenda would not produce 
the desired results. In some instances, packaging reforms or the National Campaign’s multi-year investments in 
states helped overcome local resistance to compromise.
The low-profile nature of the National Campaign and its funders was a mixed blessing. Having a local organization 
and allies serve as the public face of the state campaigns was a sound strategic decision, but because the National 
Campaign and its funders were one step removed, they did not get as much publicity (or credit) as they could 
have. At the same time, the National Campaign could have done more to tout the collective accomplishments of 
the state campaigns it supported. Maintaining a low profile is not necessarily at odds with doing more storytelling, 
which could have had significant benefits. In particular, by not connecting the National Campaign more explicitly 
to the National Communications Effort, an opportunity was missed to broaden the national dialogue about 
juvenile justice reform and foster the sense that each state campaign was part of a “national wave.” Finally, 
wariness about legislative advocacy and engaging in lobbying made it hard for the National Campaign to attract 
the “big tent” of funders and nonprofits that it originally envisioned.
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The main strengths of the National Campaign’s approach were that it was practical, 
flexible, and produced meaningful results relatively quickly through the passage of 
legislation. The chief downsides of the approach were that, by design, the National 
Campaign and its funders were not particularly visible, it did not appeal broadly to other 
funders, and it did not necessarily enhance state capacity beyond the short-term (as 
noted in Finding 6).
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The National Communications Effort generated high-quality media coverage and social media conversations 
about juvenile justice that highlighted 1) problems caused by outdated and ineffective policies, 2) the need for 
solutions that balance accountability with rehabilitation, and 3) the young people who deserve a justice system 
that accounts for their differences from adults. These three core message tracks appeared much more frequently 
in the National Communications Effort’s news stories and Twitter activity than in non-affiliated media coverage 
and Tweets about juvenile justice.
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Interest in and appetite for overturning harsh, ineffective, and expensive practices and replacing them with 
policies that keep communities safe while helping young people grow into responsible adults have no doubt 
increased since the National Campaign entered the field. The National Campaign infused resources and valuable 
strategic assistance into a landscape in which momentum for reforms was growing. It played a role in accelerating 
reforms and expanding enthusiasm among lawmakers to address policies that have led to an increasing number 
of young people tried in criminal court and incarcerated.
Rising support among conservative lawmakers for reforms is another positive indication of the Fourth Wave and 
affirms the positive impact of the National Campaign’s contributions. Its help in leveraging bipartisan support 
to enact legislation between 2011 and 2015 was built on the lessons from Models for Change.  At the same 
time, although conditions may be riper for reform than they have been in a decade, and excitement exists, it is 
unclear who will take up the charge to lead on juvenile justice issues nationally. As the MacArthur Foundation 
and National Campaign discovered, there is a lot of potential to accelerate policy changes, but it takes leadership 
and the infusion of additional resources to “move the ball forward.”
The widespread policy changes achieved with the support provided by the National 
Campaign contributed to momentum that had been building nationwide since 2007. 
Although it may be too soon to tell, increased receptiveness among lawmakers, the 
emergence of support among conservative lawmakers for reforms, and continued 
enthusiasm on the part of state-based groups are positive indications that there is a 
“Fourth Wave of Juvenile Justice Reform.”
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The National Communications Effort successfully inserted a new narrative about 
juvenile justice in the media coverage and social media conversations it generated. It 
also significantly elevated the profile and influence of associated spokespeople in the 
media. The combined success of the National Communications Effort’s messages and 
messengers appeared to influence the broader narrative about juvenile justice in both 
national media and social media.
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2013 Earned Media 
narrative composition
2014 Earned Media 
narrative composition
2015 Earned Media 
narrative composition
Problems Solutions Kids
38%
23%39%
28%
43%
29%
21%
32%
47%
Additionally, the National Communications Effort positioned its spokespeople as go-to experts and resources 
for reporters covering juvenile justice. Over the duration of the National Communications Effort, the number of 
spokespeople’s quotes or mentions in media coverage increased by nearly 125%. The reports released by the 
National Communications Effort created critical media opportunities for positioning juvenile justice advocates as 
experts on the issue and resources for media. In 2014, the year when the National Communications Effort pursued 
a “hybrid” approach of report development and capacity building, there was a 55% increase in spokespeople 
quotes from the previous year. With this approach, the National Communications Effort both created news 
moments for spokespeople and inserted them into breaking news.
Although the National Communications Effort did not set out to shift the broader media landscape on juvenile 
justice issues, it contributed to a notable increase in the amount of national media coverage and Twitter 
conversations about juvenile justice. It may have also influenced, to some degree, the content of the broader 
media landscape. By the end of the National Communications Effort, the core message tracks not only appeared 
in more stories in the national media landscape, but they also appeared repeatedly in those stories.
All of the reports released by the National Communications Effort, whether problems- or solutions-oriented, 
secured news coverage. However, the reports that packaged and positioned successful reform efforts as part of 
a growing trend were the most successful in garnering media coverage. For example, “The Comeback States” 
report—which revealed a significant reduction in youth incarceration and examined the solutions that contributed 
to that reduction in different states—generated significantly more news stories than any other report developed 
Key factors for successfully engaging the media and advancing a new narrative included 
publicizing reform solutions, highlighting the lived experiences of adolescents in the 
juvenile justice system, and focusing on the system’s disproportionate impact on certain 
groups.
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The National Communications Effort successfully attracted and built a Facebook audience in which the majority 
of people were either between the ages of 18 and 24 or 35 and 50—the age ranges that corresponded to the 
primary target audiences. On Twitter, most of the users who engaged with the National Communications Effort 
in some way were involved in the juvenile justice community, most likely as advocates or practitioners. Based on 
the National Communications Effort’s earned media coverage in a wide array of outlets, we can safely assume it 
reached people who comprised its target audiences, as well as others. Of the 321 news stories generated by the 
National Communications Effort, 87% ran in mainstream media outlets with general readerships. Though these 
placements succeeded in making juvenile justice more of a mainstream issue than it had been before, they do 
not indicate the extent to which the National Communications Effort reached its target audiences, because it is 
impossible to isolate specific audiences from a general readership.
While it’s clear that the National Communications Effort largely reached its target audiences and increased their 
awareness of juvenile justice issues, analysis of engagement data revealed some lessons to consider for future 
communications work. The rationale behind selecting young people and parents as target audiences was that 
they “should care” and “can do something about it”—but the National Communications Effort was largely unable 
to provide that “something” for its audiences to do.32 This challenge also hindered  the National Communications 
Effort from engaging affinity groups—organizations whose followers aligned with the primary target audiences—
to promote the Mistakes Kids Make campaign and content.
The National Communications Effort used several channels to reach and increase 
awareness among its target audiences, which was important because different 
audiences responded to different channels. The strategy to reach young people and 
parents through the Mistakes Kids Make Facebook page was largely successful. The 
juvenile justice community most clearly responded to the National Communications 
Effort’s earned media coverage and Twitter activity.
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by the National Communications Effort. The sequel to that report, “The Comeback and Coming-From-Behind 
States,” generated the second highest number of media hits. In fact, the media hits generated by these two 
reports (180 in total) exceeded the media hits of all other reports combined (105 total).
Additionally, the National Communications Effort’s work to identify and cultivate storytellers paid important 
dividends. Through ongoing work with partner organizations, the National Communications Effort identified 
several individuals in 2015 who had compelling personal stories that illustrated and humanized the need for 
reform. These stories were leveraged for high-impact earned media coverage in outlets that reached the 
National Communications Effort’s target audiences. The National Communications Effort also leveraged the 
media’s interest in the lived experience of children in the juvenile justice system through its rapid response work. 
These moments yielded high-value earned media coverage when the National Communications Effort was able 
to quickly line up spokespeople who could offer a new or novel perspective on breaking news.
 32 As noted on page 3, the MacArthur Foundation, in consultation with the National Campaign, decided to make the National Communications  
  Effort complementary to the National Campaign rather than connected to it. Furthermore, given that reform goals or solutions for each state  
  campaign were determined locally, the Foundation chose not to have a call to action.
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Moments when the National Communications Effort was able to directly support reform 
efforts, or generate media coverage at the state level, showed the greatest potential for 
helping position a Fourth Wave of Juvenile Justice Reform.
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Although it was not the intent or objective of the National Communications Effort to directly contribute to policy 
reform, the MacArthur Foundation was interested in understanding what could be learned about the impact 
of the National Communications Effort on reform efforts. When the National Communications Effort elevated 
reform successes in state juvenile justice systems, its work showed signs of accelerating or softening the ground 
for reform. For example, the National Campaign states that were featured in the “The Comeback States” and the 
“The Comeback and Coming-From-Behind States” reports achieved big gains at nearly twice the rate of other 
National Campaign states. To be sure, these reports featured states where reform had already taken root, and 
success begets success. However, this correlation suggests that more closely linking the National Communications 
Effort to the National Campaign could have helped advance the work of the National Campaign.
BerlinRosen’s analysis of the media coverage generated by the National Communications Effort, as well as the 
broader media landscape, revealed a stark difference between the way that state media and national media 
covered the same report or news moment, indicating that state media narratives on juvenile justice were in 
greater need of a shift than the national media narrative. In state outlets, problems-oriented messaging accounted 
for 46% of the narrative; in national media, it accounted for only 39%. Kids-oriented messaging constituted 
just 21% of the narrative in state outlets; in national outlets, it constituted 31%. A review of earned media 
coverage confirmed that messaging about young people being different from adults was notably less prevalent 
in state outlets than in national outlets. The National Communications Effort had the biggest impact on state-
level media coverage when it developed and released reports, especially if those reports included state-by-state 
comparisons. Although the reports were time- and resource-intensive, they were key to landing media coverage 
in the states and shifting the narrative to be more favorable toward reform.
Implications
After 20 years, the MacArthur Foundation announced that its support for work in juvenile justice is coming to a 
close, and the National Campaign will conclude in 2017. Through a grant to the Rockefeller Family Fund in 2016, 
the MacArthur Foundation is supporting a final year of state campaign operations in 15 states. In reflecting on 
the implications of the National Campaign and National Communications Effort, several lessons emerged that 
may be useful to the juvenile justice community, funding partners, and possibly other issue advocacy efforts. 
First and foremost, the MacArthur Foundation is well positioned to speak to the value of generating bipartisan 
backing for juvenile justice reforms and can serve as a powerful educator about the ways in which foundations 
can support advocacy. Additional lessons learned from the National Campaign and National Communications 
Effort that may be of value to the juvenile justice community and Foundation include, but aren’t limited to, the 
following:
 •  With a national, multi-year initiative, there is value in maintaining a laser-like focus on being accountable  
     to one big goal, but then being responsive to each state’s context and willing to adapt and compromise.
 •  It often took two years or two sessions to enact big changes: one year to lay the groundwork, prepare a  
     state campaign, craft smart bill language, and develop relationships, and one year to see the reform  
     goals come to fruition.
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 •  Even if legislation is the main focus, be more intentional about how legislative and non- legislative  
     reform goals can comprise a more comprehensive agenda. The reported efforts to advance policy  
     changes at the “municipal, county, or regional level” that took place while the National Campaign was  
     involved in various states did not necessarily happen by design. The synergies were mainly a happy  
     accident. Figure out what support is most needed in order to tackle non-legislative reforms, especially  
     because it is the kind of work that can be supported with 501c3 funds, and, in some states, is much  
     easier to advance.
 •  To create a media narrative that both makes the case for and supports a reform movement, it is  
     important to craft an integrated media strategy that generates coverage at both the state and national  
     levels. Media coverage is crucial at the state level—that is the arena where reforms are enacted—but  
     it is also where the media narrative is less favorable for reform. Media coverage at the national level  
     is crucial for demonstrating growing momentum and shaping the views of thought leaders and  
     influencers. Developing content and other narrative strategies that package gains, compare states, and  
     highlight emerging trends is a key way to achieve both state and national media attention.
 •  There is value in identifying and cultivating individuals who are willing to share their stories with  
     media—and policymakers—about their experiences with the juvenile justice system. Their stories  
     illustrate the long-term impact and consequences of the problems that persist in the juvenile justice  
     system and remind audiences that individual children have nothing less than their lives at stake. Most  
     importantly, personal stories can help create a sense of urgency among policymakers and the media that  
     change needs to happen. Whenever possible, prioritize and develop systems to identify and activate  
     people who can tell their story as part of media outreach and report releases.
 •  Plan for what you want to leave behind at the beginning, and embed learning and evaluation activities  
     into the initiative or campaign design from the outset and establish a baseline. Monitor rollbacks and  
     consider providing limited transition funding to support implementation. Also, funds permitting,  
     consider conducting a fiscal analysis of the financial impacts of future campaigns.
 •  Integrate communications strategies with policy campaigns. Communications is fundamentally about  
     telling a story, and the policy work provides the content of that story. The introduction, movement,  
     passage—or even defeat—of policy propels a story forward. When designed and executed well,  
     communications strategies that support policy work at both the local and national levels can create a  
     virtuous cycle of momentum and narrative change that is necessary to spark and sustain a movement.
 •  Consider applying the success factors identified through this evaluation to assess whether conditions  
     are ripe to pursue legislative reforms and evaluate future juvenile justice campaigns (and possibly  
     other legislative efforts). These success factors largely dovetail with the conditions viewed by researchers 
     and advocacy practitioners as essential to successful policy campaigns and they appear in advocacy  
     assessment tools created by the Stanford Social Innovation Review, Alliance for Justice, and other  
     organizations.33 However, the success factors presented here reflect what we learned specifically about  
     juvenile justice through the work of the National Campaign. The success factors can function as a  
     framework for juvenile justice advocates and grantmakers to look at conditions in each state and score  
     them from “not present” to “present.” For other initiatives or projects that involve advocacy, applying  
     this type of framework from the outset can increase the consistency of assessments and evaluations of  
     advocacy efforts across states and campaigns.
 33 For example, the nine conditions described in “Assessing Advocacy” published by the Stanford Social Innovation Review in 2013 include:  
  functioning venue(s) for adoption, open policy window, feasible solution, dynamic master plan, strong campaign leader(s), influential support  
  coalition, mobilized public, powerful inside champions, and clear implementation path.
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CHECKLIST OF SUCCESS FACTORS*
Feasible set of locally determined reform goals or solutions
Legislative and gubernatorial champion(s)
Capable lobbyists and relationships with key legislators
Bipartisan support
Strong impetus or timeliness for reform
Communications strategy and effective messaging
Engaged allies (e.g., judges, prosecutors, county administrators, department of corrections)
Involvement of respected and knowledgeable local nonprofit advocacy organizations
Access to juvenile justice research and policy expertise
Capacity and ability to coordinate and manage reform efforts
Active grassroots base of supporters
Public awareness
Cost-savings analysis
* This checklist of success factors relates to Finding 4 and stems from our analysis of the factors that contributed most significantly  
   toward advancing juvenile justice reform in each state.
Thank You
It has been a pleasure working with the MacArthur Foundation to design and conduct this evaluation. Grassroots 
Solutions and BerlinRosen hope that the findings and lessons learned are useful and informative for the 
MacArthur Foundation, the Funders’ Collaborative, National Campaign and National Communications Effort staff 
and stakeholders, and the broader juvenile justice community.
